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Foundations of Legal Liabilit. By Thomas Atkins Street. Three
Volumes, pages xxx, 5oo; xviii, 559; xi, 572. Edward
Thompson Co., x9o6.
In these days, out of the great mass of legal publications
comparatively few emerge as real achievements in legal
scholarship. The subject of this review is one of the few. Very
evidently it is by an academic man and it appeals primarily to
academic students of the law; but it appeals equally as much to
the practitioner who desires to understand fundamental princi-
ples and to know other things than the mere tricks of the trade.
The three volumes deal respectively with Torts, Contracts and
Common Law Actions. They purport to contain "a presenta-
tion of the theory and development of the common law."
Throughout the author shows a knowledge of the best previous
thought on the subject, a readiness to adopt and make use of it,
and strength enough to depart from it on occasion and come to a
different conclusion. It is impossible in a brief review to con-
sider the accuracy of many of these conclusions, nor is it possible
to criticise them intelligently without a careful study of the
sources from which they are drawn.
The treatment of the subject of liability for torts in the first
volume is not revolutionary, but is original and highly enlighten-
ing. The classification of torts is in some respects new and is
of assistance in gaining an understanding of the reasons for lia-
bility. For instance, the author puts trespasses committed not
by the defendant directly, but through agents, animate and inan-
imate, into one class, under the title "secondary trespass forma-
tion." This classification, besides grouping several allied sub-jects not heretofore logically classified, assists the author in work-
ing out his treatment of the subject of negligence. The exposi-
tion of the principles underlying liability for torts in the various
subdivisions of the subject is uniformly good, particularly so in
the cases of secondary trespass, defamation, malice and negli-
gence. Perhaps the author is not wholly justified in his criticism
of the doctrine that negligencc consists in a breach of duty to take
care. And perhaps he has not improved upcn it as much as he
thinks. Is it much of an improvement over "negligenceis a
breach of duty" to say "negligence is a sort of legal delin-
quency?" However, he is right in saying that the doctrine that
the law imposes a duty to take care is no real explanation of the
foundation of liability for negligence.
The subject of Contracts in volume two is not given as com-
pl-'te an exposition as is the subject of Torts; but the results
obtained therein by the author are in part more startling and
original. Volume two contains four parts and an appendix.
The author treats first the history and general principles of con-
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tract; second, the history and theory of the law of bailment; third,
the history and principles of the law of bills and notes; and fourth,
the law of representation or agency as affecting the relations of
principal and agent and master and servant. The appendix con-
tains the negotiable instrument's law with annotations. We may
dismiss the second, third and fourth parts with the remark that
they are adequate and accurate, but not new and unusual. The
treatment of agency is much like that of Professor Huffcut. The
historical treatment of bills and notes is deserving of especial
commendation.
The first part alone of the second volume ought to be suffi-
cient to establish the author's reputation as a brilliant thinker in
contracts. After two chapters on the early history of contract,
he plunges into an investigation of the doctrine of consideration,
its foundation and its character, necessarily involving a discussion
of the actions of debt and assumpsit. It is here that he departs
most widely from prior accepted conclusions. Consideration in
the sense of a detriment to the promise is required only in the
case of unilateral contracts. Bilateral contracts acquire their
binding character from consent alone, and not at all from consid-
eration in the sense of detriment. He abandons the vain effort
of determining how it is that a promise is binding because it is a
detriment and is a detriment because it is binding. A third form
in which consideration for a promise may appear is a pre-existing
legal obligation or debt, the doctrine of consideration as a detri-
ment to the promise being here again abandoned. No doubt
these conclusions will find strong opposition on the part- of those
who have been at so much pains to establish the accepted the-
ories of consideration.
The author's mas ery of the distinctions between unilateral
and bilateral contracts is very gratifying to the reader. His
treatment of the foundation of liability on a bilateral contract is
beyond question a brilliant achievement in constructive reason-
ing. He lays down the principle that the obligation of a bilat-
eral contract is based upon consent alone, but he limits the num-
ber of enforceable bilateral contracts to those consisting of
mutual promises to do acts which, considercd wholly apart from
the circumstances of the individual case, would be a detriment to
the actor. This limitation necessarily destroys the simplicity of
the author's construction, but is of course required by the long-
established course of judicial decision. By means of this princi-
ple the author explains the seeming paradox that a promise to
perform an act may be valid consideration for a promise when
the actual performance itself would not be. He asserts that a
unilateral promise is, for historical reasons, not enforceable
unless the act or forbearance given in return amounts to a detri-
ment, but that bilateral promises are binding purely on consen-
sual grounds. However, even though we should agree with him
that the basis of liability on bilateral contracts is consent and not
consideration, still it seems doubtful whether we should not still
further limit the number of enforceable bilateral contracts to those
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consisting of mutual promises to act or to forbear, which act or
forbearance will amount to a detriment in the individual case. This
would bring the rule very close to that constructed by Professor
Williston, though it would avoid the necessity of showing that
the ma)ing of a promise is in itself a detriment. It would fur-
ther be in harmony with those very numerous American decis-
ions to the effect that bilateral promises are invalid where one of
them is to do that which the promisor is already bound by con-
tract to do. The author does not give an adequate review of
these cases. Instead, he places conclusive weight upon such
decisions as Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295, and Abbott v. Doane,
163 Mass. 433.
The author invents (Volume II, page 74) the term "incompe-
tent consideration" for the doing of an act which the actor is
under a legal obligation to do. His treatment of this is not alto-
gether convincing. He adopts Sir F. Pollock's reasoning that
the doing of such an act is no consideration because it is no detri-
ment to the doer. Later, however (Volume II, page 99), in sup-
porting the doctrine that part payment of a debt is not sufficient
consideration for a promise to forego the residue, he cites Pro-
fessor Ames to the effect that the doing of any act is such a detri-
ment to the actor as will support a promise, and adds: "We
admit that payment of part of a debt is an act and that such act
furnishes a consideration for the promise to forego the residue.
The point, however, is that the consideration is incompetent."
This appears to say, part payment is incompetent consideration
because it is no detriment, and it is no detriment because it is
incompetent. The question turns on whether part payment is
actually a detriment, and there is much to be said in favor of the
position of Professor Ames.
The author's conception of legal duty as an adequate substi-
tute for consideration in the sense of detriment causes him to
classify many obligations as truly contractual even though they
are not assumptual. It enables him to throw a clear light upon
the situation existing with reference to promises for the benefit
of a third person, the chapters on that subject being a distinct
addition to its literature. It further requires him to re-classify
the subject of quasi-contracts. Among the quasi-contracts he
places "promises implied as of fact." It appears to the reviewer
that the author's treatment of this term is not altogether clear.
Actual, definite promises may be made by conduct as well as by
words, in which case the obligation assumed is certainly not
quasi-contractual. Yet such promises would seem to be "prom-
ises implied as of fact." Of course, the author is right in classi-
fying as quasi-contractual those obligations created by law
because justice demands it, even though an actual definite prom-
ise cannot be found in the conduct of the parties. But in these
cases there is no "promise implied as of fact." Notwithstanding
this possible obscurity, the author's basic idea is correct, and his
conception of legal duty as contractual is second in importance
only to his theory of bilateral contracts.
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Of his work on the doctrines of accord and satisfaction the
author, in his preface, says: "We have, it is thought, succeeded
in giving a rational and consistent account of this subject from
beginning to end." It is beyond doubt that in the main his work
bears out his statement; but it appears to the reviewer that the
author has failed to give due consideration to the distinction
between an executory accord, looked upon as a contract in itself
and as the basis of an action at law, and an executory accord
looked upon as a satisfaction of the prior obligation and a bar to
an action thereon by the creditor. It may well be that an action
lies for failure to perform an executory accord, even though there
remains a right of action on the original obligation. However,
the author's account of the historical basis for the rule that an
executory accord is no satisfaction is beyond criticism; and his
description of the doctrine as one of " the two greatest mysteries
of the common law," and as "a fossil that has come down to us
from a previous legal formation" is very apt and interesting. In
chapter xiii of volume two, the author sets forth in convincing
fashion the doctrines of novation, establishing that "in its
essence the novation is an executory accord, and the principle
underlying it is at war with the hoary rule that the executory
accord is invalid."
Volume three treats of the forms of action at common law.
It is undoubtedly true that knowledge of these actions and of their
history is necessary to an understanding of the substantive com-
mon law, and that in getting rid of these forms jurisprudence lost
as well as gained. The author's discussion of the origin and
scope of the various remedies at common law is entirely proper
and satisfactory.
The entire work is written in a clear and entertaining style.
The volumes are in dignified form, with good paper, good mar-
gins and legible, errorless type. The substance of each para-
graph is indicated in notes printed on the margin. Volume three
contains a table of some four thousand cited cases and a very full
index. In his preface the author frankly exhibits a calm confi-
dence that his work is original and well done. This confidence
is justified. A.L.C.
Elementos de Derecho Internacional Privado. Third edition. By
Manuel Torres Campos. Madrid, 19o6. Pages 549.
With what was contained in the first edition of this work,
issued in 1893, has been incorporated much of what was in the
subsequent treatise from the same pen, on the Foundations of
Extraterritorial Legislation (Bases de una Legislacion de Eztraterri-
torialidad, Madrid, i896). The present edition omits much of the
bibliography of the earlier ones and adds many references to the
publications of the last ten years, including the doings of the
four Hague Conferences for the Promotion of International Pri-
vate Law, of which the author was a distinguished member.
His discussion of the choice to be made between personal and
territorial law as the criterion of individual rights and duties, is
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especially interesting to Americans. Europe, he says, naturally
adopted the former in its reaction against feudalism (page gi).
The United States as naturally rejected it, because it was a coun-
try of immigrants (page 90). Emigration on a great scale, a uni-
versal phenomenon belonging only to modern society, has brought
a new factor into the law of the world-the mobilization of the
human race (page 92). Wherever a country receives large acces-
sions of this sort it inclines to the supremacy of its own law; if it
has few, it contends for that of the law governing the person.
Thus Italy, with less than 6o,ooo foreign residents, but which has
sent forth two millions of her people to live elsewhere, stands
strongly for the latter (page 93). The Argentine Republic, on
the other hand, in which the population of the chief city-Buenos
Ayres-is more than half foreign, follows the United States in
insisting on the former (page 94). The maxim for both nations,
he declares, is "No one is a foreigner in America" (page 97).
The work of several of the Spanish and Spanish-American
Congresses of jurists and economists, held in Spain in the last few
years, is described, and shows the strong attachment still subsist-
ing between Spain and her former American possessions. Such
a " social and economic congress," held at Madrid in ,906, under
the auspices of the "Spanish-American Union," voted to recom-
mend the ratification of all the treatises of Montevideo (of 1888-
9) in regard to matters affecting private international law, both
by Spain and by all the Spanish-American states which had not
already signified their adhesion (page 141). The ties of lan-
guage, religion and history are often stronger than any that wars
of independence can make or break.
Professor Torres Campos is of the opinion that there should
be no real difficulty in the establishment of a uniform law for the
world as to bills of exchange, since no subject can be freer from
national prejudices, or from all bonds imposed by moral, religious,
or social ideas, while none of the differences relating them in the
present laws of the nations depend on reasons that can be called
fundamental (pages 385, 386).
Whatever point the author discusses, he illumines by his clarity
both of thought and expression. It is to be regretted that, like so
many works of European jurists, the volume is without an index.
S. E B.
The Elements of Jurisprudence. By Thomas Erskine Holland.
Tenth edition, Oxford, igo6.
Holland's Jurisprudence, first published in ,88o, marked a new
phase in English legal literature. The success with which Prof.
Holland then analyzed the theory and subject matter of law is
quite sufficiently attested by the fact that since the first edition
appeared his book has had no serious competitor in the distinctive
field of formal scientific statement of the principles underlying
modem law, and the classification of rights recognized in modern
egal systems. That a tenth edition of a legal treatise which does
ot appeal directly to practitioners, has been called for in twenty-
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five years, is in countries where the common law prevails, some-
what remarkable. The book is so well known to those who make any
use of that class of legal literature that any general analysis is not
now required. The present edition is about one-fifth larger than
the first edition and about one-tenth larger than the eighth; a very
modest increase in size and quite largely accounted for by the
enlargement of the citations in foot notes. Full use has been
made of recent cases, the tenth edition containing a third more
citations than the eighth edition published in x896. The chapters
upon "The Sources of Law," "Analysis of a Right," "Antece-
dent Rights 'In Rem,'" and "Antecedent Rights 'In Personam,"'
are those in which the changes have been most material, whether
the present edition is compared either with the eighth or first
editions. These changes are not, however, so much changes in
substance as more elaborate citations or expansions of originally
brief discussions.
Since the first edition the chapter on Sources of Law has been
somewhat enlarged. Religion has been added as a source, but
the larger editions have been made in the discussion of adjudica-
tion and equity. In Chapter VIII, Analysis of a Right, the
subject of "acts" was in the x886 edition first worked out fully
from the point of view of the Will, consciousness and the manifesta-
tion of the will, and is a highly practical discussion. In Chapter
XII, the subject of the agreement in contract was also expanded in
x886, and what was termed the "newer theory" of "the reasonable
man" as the one to determine the construction to be put upon the
acts of another with reference to his intent, was recognized as the
luminous principle which "at once sweeps away the ingenious
speculations of several generations of moralists." (p. 256-7). This
is illustrative of the adoption of external standards for the deter-
mination of legal intent. This theory was elaborately worked out
by Mr. Justice Holmes in his Common Law, published in x881.
In the chapter on Public Law there is a new subdivision "Civil
Precedure by and against a State."
Upon the whole it is unusual that an institutional writer should,
after twenty-five years development in law by formal codes, mis-
cellaneous legislation, adjudication and exhaustive discussion of
the history and theory of law in various fields by such writers as
Dicey, Pollock, Maitland, and our own Holmes, find so little
necessary to be done to retain for his book the first place in the
literature of elementary jurisprudence. This fact is, in itself, the
best answer to those who question whether legal systems are col-
lectively capable of formal scientific treatment. Some of his
classifications have been criticised, but the author admits that in
certain respects this is matter of convenience and not of funda-
mental theory. To the writer the earlier part of the book in
which the nature of law and of legal right are discussed with
great clearness, has always seemed the most valuable.
The line of separation between conduct as regulated by law,
and conduct as regulated by the rules of morality and religion, is
drawn with a sure hand. The result is that the book is not spec-
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ulative nor a priori in method. Those with a taste for the meta-
physic of law, as to its origin, validity or purpose in the abstract
sense will find little. It is an actual system that is scientifically
treated, and not a theoretical, and this element of concreteness,
of actuality, is doubtless the element that accounts for the favor
with which the book has been received by English and American
students.
But words of commendation are not needed for a book in its
tenth edition. The lawyer with any scientific or philosophical
tendency, who has not read and studied Holland, has missed a
valuable aid to his general understanding of the subject of his
profession. E. B. G.
A Treatise on the Law of Munic45al Corporations. By Howard S.
Abbott. Sheep. Volume 3, Pages XIX, 3045. Keefe-David-
son Company, St. Paul, i9o5 .
This topic of the law has had such a variant growth, developing
in different parts of the country to meet the conditions as they
there arise and depending in many instances upon the legislative
action of bodies made up of men of all degrees of legal learning,
as well as all degrees of common sense, that it is difficult to class-
ify the subdivisions of the subject in a manner the logic of which
will appear to all. Judge Dillon, in his work on the subject, seems
to have based much of his arrangement upon general historical
development, the author here discussed appears to have made his
arrangement, wherever possible, upon the basis of an imagined
composite, or typical municipal corporation, taking it from its orig-
inal inception up through its growth and future life. From a legal
standpoint this is an. improvement, as a lawyer's mind more
readily follows the sequence of events in a properly conducted
legal procedure, than it does the actual, though sometimes illog-
ical, sequence of events in history.
This work is, in a great measure, to Municipal Corporations
what Wigmore is to Evidence, Thompson to Negligence and Page
to Contracts. It is not entirely analagous to any of these works,
and could not be. The peculiar and unique condition of muni-
cipal corporation law prevents that. The work does not seem
quite as exhaustive as either Wigmore or Thompson, but is more
nearly like Page. It differs from Page in that it has in its notes
more quotations from the important cases, thus putting the lawyer
in possession of the basic law even in the absence of a good
library of reports. The author realized that of those lawyers,
the main part of whose practice is in municipal corporation law,
the majority dwelt in the smaller towns and cities, where law
libraries containing complete files of all the reports are not easily
accessible, and by wisely following the example set by Judge
Dillon of inserting many and lengthy case quotations, he has
made his work especially valuable to this class of lawyers. It
would be well for every such lawyer to have this work as well as
that of Dillon, for though of necessity they do to a certain extent
cover the same ground, they are by no means entirely co-exten-
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sive; for where another author has given a good discussion of a
sub-topic, the present author instead of giving a long discussion,
merely cited, or possibly gave a short quotation from, the other
work, and a very thorough knowledge of former books on the
subject is shown.
The style of this book is not the same as that of Dillon's.
Judge Dillon's work contains more meaning per word, but it
requires earnest and closely applied study to extract the meaning,.
while in this work of Mr. Abbott's the sentences are not as a rule
quite so meaty, but the principle expressed is generally more easily
grasded at first reading. Judge Dillon seems to have put more
of his heart into his work, also more of his personal opinions,
while Mr. Abbott has to a great extent stated the law and not his
personal opinions thereon. The place where his individual ideas
most frequently creep in is in the hypothesis from which he
deduces the reason for the law, as for example at page 685, "The
less government they have, the more independent and prosperous
they are, etc," is used in explaining the rule against Municipal
Corporations engaging in private enterprises. In general, Mr.'
Abbott's style seems studied and academic, rather than sponta-
neous.
Many authors make the mistake of trying to harmonize decis-
ions that are not at all in accord. It is, of course, nice to think of
our chosen profession as the great, consistent and logical set of
authoritative rules, which in theory it of course is. But practically
it is far from that. In fact the harmonization of the rules is, and has
been, the life-work of many thousands of judges, and they are far
from perfecting their task. For a single author to attempt to
work out a perfectly consistent set of rules and have them law is
impossible. Mr. Abbott has been very successful in steering
clear of this shoal-Charybdis, but in doing so has approached its
Scylla, the leaving of apparent rather than real inconsistencies
unexplained. For example, to the mind young and seeking in
the law, it is somewhat disconcerting to read in one sentence that
"the expense, etc..... .must be paid wholly by the state," and
then to follow on into the next sentence and discover that '" by
law, however, a certain portion of the expense may be chargeable
against the county or district, etc." (p. 2461.)
The two hundred page index is very full and complete and
almost large enough to require a sub-index. In the several p oints
looked up through it, by way of experiment, it seemed to lead one
by a path shorter than is usual to a discussion of the points
sought. However, this matter of close relation between the index
and point sought, is one that is difficult to judge by experiment;
it takes the heat and zest of seeking law for an actual conflict to
bring forcibly to one's attention the great virtue of an index, or
its inadequacy, as the case may be.
On the whole, this work, although not the best of its kind, is
one upon which an enormous amount of very well directed work
has been spent, and the possession of it will save many a lawyer
the necessity of doing that work, when he desires some part of it
for a case. S. W. B.
